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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Valentin Calvillo appeals from the conviction following jury trial of seven 
counts of lewd conduct with a minor and one count of sexual abuse of a minor. 
Specifically, Calvillo contends the state committed fundamental error in closing 
argument by indirectly commenting on his right to remain silent during trial. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
C.v., the then 10 year old daughter of Calvillo's live-in girlfriend, disclosed 
Calvillo had been having sexual contact with her. (PSI, pp.1-2.) Following an 
investigation by law enforcement and a CARES interview (PSI, pp.2-3), the grand 
jury indicted Calvillo on eight charges of lewd conduct with a minor and two 
counts of sexual abuse of a minor. (R., pp.11-15.) 
Calvillo proceeded to jury trial where his attorney outlined his case in 
opening statement as a situation of he said-she said with no evidence aside from 
the victim's word that Calvillo committed any crime. (Supp. Tr., p.276, L.12 -
p.284, L.10.) Calvillo's opening statement also made it clear to the jury that 
Calvillo intended on testifying: 
Valentin is going to take the stand, and he's going to look 
you in the eyes, and he's going to say - I mean, I don't know how 
strongly. He's going to be having a hard time to not just want to 
reach out and say, "Listen to me. I didn't touch this girl. What can I 
do to prove that? Other than to say I didn't do it?" Lack of 
evidence. Jury Instruction 3. 
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(Supp. Tr., p.281, Ls.14-21.) This point was reiterated when the jury was told 
that after they heard from the victim and heard from Calvillo himself, it would 
return a verdict of not guilty. (Supp. Tr., p.284, Ls.3-10.) 
Calvillo was present for trial throughout jury selection the first day. (Supp. 
Tr., p.7, Ls.1-5.) Calvillo was also present in court on the second day of trial 
during the opening statements by the attorneys and the presentation of the 
state's witnesses, including the victim. (Tr., pA5, Ls.10-14.) However, the 
morning of the third day of trial, Calvillo's attorney advised the court Calvillo was 
not present because he was ill. (Tr., p.259, L.8 - p.260, L.14.) The court 
ultimately released the jury for the day and afforded Calvillo the opportunity to 
return to court the next morning to continue his trial. (Tr., p.287, LA - p. 288, 
L.11.) 
Calvillo again failed to appear for his fourth day of trial, although he had 
made a brief appearance outside the courthouse the previous day to speak with 
his attorney. (Tr., p.304, L.8 - p.307, L.19.) Given Calvillo's continued absence 
and the lack of an explanation for it, the court proceeded with trial in Calvillo's 
absence. (Tr., p.311, L.15 - p.317, L.13.) Counsel for Calvillo rested his case 
(Tr., p.324, Ls.21-22) and ultimately waived his right to give a closing argument 
(Supp. Tr., p.318, LsA-5). 
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In his absence, the jury found Calvillo guilty of seven counts of lewd 
conduct with a minor and one count of sexual abuse of a minor.1 (R., pp.247-
250.) Calvillo was ultimately discovered incarcerated in San Diego. (R., pp.254-
260.) Upon his return to Idaho, Calvillo filed a motion for a new trial. (R., 
pp.300-306.) The court denied his motion for a new trial, finding Calvillo "was 
voluntarily absent from his trial after having attended for two full days." (R., 
p.402.) 
The court sentenced Calvillo to concurrent 30 year unified sentences with 
the first 15 years fixed on each lewd conduct conviction, as well as 15 years fixed 
for sexual abuse of a minor. (R., pp.433-435.) Calvillo timely appealed. (R., 
pp.471-475.) 
1 The court had previously granted Calvillo's Rule 29 motion as to count nine, 
sexual abuse of a minor, (Tr., p.284, L.9 - p.285, L. 7) and the jury was unable to 
reach a unanimous verdict on the lewd conduct charge in count three (R., p.248). 
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ISSUE 
Calvillo states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct during closing 
arguments, rising to the level of a fundamental error, when the 
prosecutor indirectly commented on Mr. Calvillo's right to remain 
silent by repeatedly referencing C.v.'s testimony at trial as 
"uncontroverted"? 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Calvillo failed to show that his claim of prosecutorial misconduct 
constitutes fundamental error? 
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ARGUMENT 
Calvillo Has Failed To Show That His Claim Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Constitutes Fundamental Error 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Calvillo claims that closing argument remarks 
made by the prosecutor at his criminal trial constituted prosecutorial misconduct 
of such an egregious nature that he is entitled a reversal of his conviction and 
sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-14.) Calvillo failed to raise this issue below. 
Since this issue was not preserved for appeal, to prevail Calvillo must 
demonstrate that not only do the comments constitute prosecutorial misconduct, 
but that misconduct constitutes fundamental error. Calvillo has failed to meet this 
burden, and his appeal must therefore be denied. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved 
for appeal through an objection at triaL" State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citations omitted). Where a claim is raised for the first time 
on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the error alleged qualifies as 
fundamental error. kL at 980. 
C. Calvillo Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In Relation To The 
Prosecutor's Closing Argument 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself ... " U.S. Const. amend. V. 
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Therefore, a prosecutor may not urge the jury to draw on inference of guilt from 
defendant's failure to testify at trial. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
Calvillo contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct and violated his 
Fifth Amendment right during her closing argument by referring to certain 
evidence as "uncontroverted" on several occasions. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-14.) 
There was no objection to the comments at trial. The statements complained of 
by Calvillo are as follows: 
And what you have heard from [C.V.] was uncontroverted evidence 
that proves every one of these counts beyond a reasonable doubt. 
You've heard uncontroverted evidence from [CV.] what this 
defendant did, and what he did was sexual abuse of a child. 
That's the uncontroverted evidence of what that defendant did to 
her in the front seat of the car at that park, and that's for Count X, 
Instruction 28. 
That uncontroverted evidence proves this case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
... if you can recall that testimony, which has been uncontroverted, 
which proves the defendant committed this crime. 
That uncontroverted evidence, which is entirely believable, after 
you watched her testify and say what she said during this trial, that 
proves this case, that count, beyond reasonable doubt. 
(Appellant's brief, p.12 (citations to Supp. Tr. omitted).) 
Under the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in Perry, unobjected to claims of 
constitutional error are reviewed using a three-part test: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated, (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
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affected the defendant's sUbstantial rights meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
Application of the foregoing standard to Calvillo's claim of error 
demonstrates he has failed to satisfy any of the three prongs of the Perry 
analysis, and has thus failed to meet his burden of establishing he is entitled to 
reversal of his conviction. 
1. Calvillo Has Failed To Demonstrate That One Or More Of His 
Unwaived Constitutional Rights Were Violated 
Calvillo claims the "prosecutor's repeated and gratuitous references to [the 
victim's] testimony as 'uncontroverted' constitute an impermissible comment on 
[his] right to remain silent at triaL" (Appellant's brief, p.8.) However, a review of 
the applicable law and the context of the statements made during closing 
argument reveals that Calvillo is not entitled to a presumption of invocation of the 
right to testify where he absconded rather than simply declined to testify at trial. 
"The Fifth Amendment guarantee that no person may be compelled in a 
criminal case to be a witness against himself is violated if a prosecutor comments 
upon a defendant's failure to testify at triaL" State v. Jackson, 151 Idaho 376, 
382, 256 P.3d 784, 790 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 
614 (1965); State v. McMurry, 143 Idaho 312,314, 143 P.3d 400,402 (Ct. App. 
2006). "The rule set forth in Griffin applies to direct and indirect comments on the 
failure to testify." State v. McMurry, 143 Idaho 312,314, 143 P.3d 400,402 (Ct. 
App. 2006) (citations ';omitted). Generally, the right to silence is not self-
executing, but must be invoked. See State v. Perez, 145 Idaho 383, 387, 179 
7 
P.3d 346, 350 (Ct. App. 2008) ("A suspect's invocation of the right to remain 
silent also must be clear and unequivocal." (citations omitted)). The exception to 
this, however, occurs at trial where no affirmative invocation of the right to remain 
silent is required. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 609-15. In this instant case, however, 
the trial exception to the requirement that an invocation of the right to remain 
silent did not apply because Calvillo's trial counsel promised the jury in opening 
statement that Calvillo would be testifying. Instead, Calvillo absconded before 
telling his side of the story. 
Although it is clear Calvillo was well aware of his right to testify. his failure 
to testify was based on his flight to Mexico to avoid taking the stand instead of 
from his voluntary election not to testify pursuant to his right to remain silent. In 
fact. until the night before the final day of trial. Calvillo had been actively 
preparing to take the stand. 
In concluding Calvillo "was voluntarily absent from his trial after having 
attended for two full days" (R., pA02). the trial court found Calvillo had faked an 
illness in order to stop his trial and get a new attorney: 
No proof of Calvillo having been treated for medical 
conditions was provided at [the] time [of trial]. nor was such proof 
ever provided. Indeed, given Castillo's testimony before this court 
during evidentiary hearing. it is clear that Calvillo was never treated 
by any medical personnel that day; he was never in the emergency 
room. and the he was feigning such illness for an illicit motive to 
prepare his getaway. He was a persuasive actor in this regard -
even cor;lVincing his seasoned defense counsel of his supposed ill 
health. 
(R., pp.387-388.) Calvillo watched the presentation of the state's case and 
subsequently met with his attorney to prepare for his testimony the night before 
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Calvillo fled to Mexico. (R., p.382.) His counsel believed "that Calvillo was going 
to be a good witness." Calvillo, however, apparently decided his own testimony 
would not be sufficient to overcome the assertions made by his victim and 
claimed upon his return to Idaho that he was not pleased with his counsel's 
performance: 
... in the affidavit, Calvillo contends that on November 18, 
2011 [sic], the day he was expected to testify, he was "very upset 
about [his attorney's] preparation of the case." He felt that [his 
attorney's] performance was "poor and he would get convicted 
without the jury ever hearing [the] defendant's evidence." He 
further averred that he wanted to "stop the trial and get a new 
attorney." 
Calvillo further "understood" that the trial could stop if there 
was a "big" problem, and that he could get a new trial with a 
different lawyer. The source of his "understanding" was never 
explained to the court. 
In paragraph 7 of his affidavit, [Calvillo] states: "in light of 
that belief, [Calvillo] told his attorney that he was too sick to come 
to Court on the last day the defendant was in court. [His attorney] 
told [Calvillo] to be in Court at 11 :00 a.m. on the 18th of November, 
2010. 
(R., pp.389-390 (citations to the referenced affidavit omitted).) 
After disappearing before his trial was over, "Calvillo remained at large 
until his arrest in California, after he had been returned from Mexico by his 
bonding company." (R., p.389.) In concluding "Calvillo's absence was voluntary" 
(R., pA01), the trial court found "Calvillo was to testify for his life, and instead he 
chose to leave, playing 'fast and loose' with the court" (R., p.391). Because 
Calvillo fled instead of remaining for the final day of his jury trial, he is not entitled 
to the presumption of invocation of his right to remain silent at trial. 
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Because Calvillo has not established the violation of one or more of his 
unwaived constitutional rights, he has failed to meet the first prong of the Perry 
fundamental error analysis. 
2. Calvillo Has Failed To Show That Any Alleged Error Was Clear Or 
Obvious, Or That The Failure To Object Was Not A Tactical 
Decision 
For the reasons discussed above, Calvillo cannot show any Fifth 
Amendment violation, let alon~ any violation which was "clear or obvious." 
Calvillo cannot show that the jury interpreted the prosecutor's statements in 
closing argument as indirectly commenting on his right to silence. 
Further, Calvillo also cannot show that his trial counsel's decision not to 
object during the closing argument was based on ignorance of the law or other 
objective shortcomings, as opposed to being merely a tactical decision. Calvillo's 
counsel was clearly aware of and sensitive to the issue of Calvillo's voluntary 
decision not to return to his trial and testify following the declaration to the jury 
that he would in fact tell his side of the story, and not ignorant to Calvillo's Fifth 
Amendment rights. 
Calvillo has failed to show that any alleged error was "clear or obvious," or 
that his trial counsel's decision not to object to the prosecutor's rebuttal was 
based on any ignorance of the law or objective shortcomings. Calvillo has 
therefore failed to meet the second prong of the fundamental error analysis. 
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3. Calvillo Has Failed To Demonstrate That Any Alleged Error 
Affected The Outcome Of The Trial Proceedings 
Misconduct by a prosecutor is fundamental only if the alleged misconduct 
is so egregious or inflammatory that any prejudice arising from it was not, or 
could not have been, remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury 
that it should be disregarded. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785-786, 948 P.2d 
127, 140-141 (1997); State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 891,898,792 P.2d 916, 923 
(1990); State v. Missamore, 114 Idaho 879, 761 P.2d 1231 (Ct. App. 1988); State 
v. Ames, 109 Idaho 373, 707 P.2d 484 (Ct. App. 1985). In this case, even 
assuming that the prosecutor committed misconduct by indirectly referencing the 
fact that Calvillo did not testify, an objection and curative instruction made after 
the prosecutor's first reference to "uncontroverted" evidence would have easily 
remedied any potential for the jury to make inappropriate inferences from the 
comments, and would have prevented subsequent use of terms such as 
"uncontroverted." 
The district court clearly instructed the jury that it was not to draw any 
inference of guilt from the fact that Calvillo did not testify at trial. (R., p.223.) A 
jury should not be assumed to have utterly disregarded a direct instruction not to 
make such a negative inference, and instead be assumed to have been so 
influenced by a prosecutor's possible indirect reference to a defendant's silence 
as to disregard those specific a:,d direct instructions. State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 
747, 751, 947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 
481, 927 P.2d 451,454 (Ct. App. 1996) (An appellate court presumes that the 
jury followed the district court's instructions.). 
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Calvillo, who must satisfy all three prongs of the Perry fundamental error 
analysis, has failed to meet any of them. He has therefore failed to show 
fundamental error in the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument. 
4. Any Misconduct By The Prosecutor In Closing Argument 
Was Harmless In Light Of Calvillo's Flight To Mexico During 
Trial 
Were this Court to determine the statements by the prosecutor in closing 
argument regarding the uncontroverted nature of the victim's testimony that only 
Calvillo could have contradicted were prosecutorial misconduct amounting to 
fundamental error, any error is harmless in light of Calvillo's flight to Mexico. 
"Error is not reversible, however, unless it is prejudicial." State v. 
Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 951, 277 P.3d 392, 398 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing State v. 
Stoddard, 105 Idaho 169, 171,667 P.2d 272, 274 (Ct. App. 1983)). "With limited 
exceptions, even constitutional error may be harmless." kL Here, if Calvillo were 
allowed a retrial, it would include the testimony of his victim as to the many 
instances of sexual contact. Additionally, a jury would hear that after listening to 
his victim's testimony, Calvillo decided to flee to Mexico to avoid further 
prosecution instead of taking the stand and telling his side of the story as he 
indicated at the beginning of trial he would do. This added evidence of 
consciousness of guilt greatly increases the strength of the case against Calvillo. 
Against that backdrop, it could be concluded beyond reasonable doubt that any 




The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Calvillo's judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
DATED this 16th day of October, 20 
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